The Voice of the Citizens – The Structural Dilemma of Electoral Politics in the Maldives and a Look Ahead to 2028

The elections are not won by the strength of political parties. It's the common Citizens view that shows from the votes.

It seems like political party activists and local leaders have forgotten this simple fact.

PNC (current elected government) still has the advantage to win 2028 election if they mend their ways and fix the mistakes.

Since the Maldives adopted multiparty democracy in 2008, it has held six presidential elections, each resulting in a change of government – no president has yet won a second term. In this archipelago nation of about half a million people, the logic of electoral victory is quite different from that of many mature democracies. The mobilisation capacity of party machines and the volume of campaign funds are often not the decisive variables. What truly determines electoral outcomes is the political attitude expressed by ordinary citizens through their votes.

I. The Political Landscape of the Maldives

The Maldivian political landscape is dominated by two major forces. The ruling People's National Congress (PNC) and its alliance with the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), led by former President Yameen, defeated the then-governing Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) in the 2023 presidential election. However, the MDP, as the country's first pro-democracy party, remains the PNC's primary political rival. Before the 2023 election, a split occurred within the MDP, with former President Nasheed leaving to form The Democrats, which took about 7% of the vote in the first round – a split widely considered a key factor in then-President Solih's defeat. The Democrats subsequently dissolved and rejoined the MDP in 2025, reuniting the opposition, which is now actively courting centrist and swing voters at the grassroots level.

Notably, in the local council elections and referendum held on 6 April 2026, the opposition MDP won mayoral seats in all five cities, while the ruling PNC won only 11% of the city council seats in those five cities. The referendum saw 71% of voters reject President Muizzu's proposed constitutional amendment, which sought to merge presidential and parliamentary elections. Described as "the most complex election day in the modern democratic history of the Maldives" – with voters casting between five and eleven ballots – turnout still reached a record 73%. Analysts and political party figures said the referendum "effectively became a broader judgement on the government."

II. Theories Behind the Elections: Personalised Politics, Clientelism, and Vote-Buying

The unique logic of Maldivian electoral politics can be explained through several political science theories.

1. Personalised Politics in a Small Island State

Research by political scientist Wouter Veenendaal shows that the small population size of micro-states fosters personalised politics – political competition revolves more around personal charisma than party platforms, political elites dominate decision-making, patron-client relationships form between citizens and politicians, and formal political institutions are often bypassed. In the Maldives, voters hold highly polarised attitudes toward specific political figures, and electoral outcomes often defy partisan expectations. In the 2026 local elections, several islands associated with particular political leaders saw results inconsistent with party affiliations – voters from Vice President Latheef's home island supported the MDP candidate, while voters from MDP MP Zakir's home island swung to the PNC.

2. Clientelism and Vote-Buying

Clientelism theory explains why Maldivian elections are not simply competitions over policy. Political scientists widely agree that in less developed countries, patron-client relationships exist between parties and large numbers of voters, who engage in strategic voting, leading to declining quality of governance.

The Maldivian case validates this theory. According to a 2025 report by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, vote-buying in Maldivian parliamentary elections has become widespread. Campaign costs typically range from 2 to 5 million Maldivian Rufiyaa, reaching as high as 15 million Rufiyaa in some constituencies, with up to 90% of campaign budgets spent on purchasing votes. The "market price" for a single vote is around 5,000 Rufiyaa, and voters even form "coalitions" to negotiate bulk deals with candidates. This culture of vote-buying commodifies votes and fundamentally distorts the representative function of democratic elections.

3. The Decisive Role of Swing Voters

Turnout in the 2023 presidential election was around 85%, lower than the historical level of over 90%. Analysts have pointed out that the apathy of centrist and swing voters had a material impact on the outcome. Since the advent of multiparty democracy in the Maldives, voters have tended to choose a new president every five years. This "desire for change" means no ruling party can take voter loyalty for granted. Electoral victory often hinges on the mood of swing voters in the final days before the election.

III. The 2023 Presidential Election: Where Theory Meets Reality

In September 2023, Muizzu defeated incumbent President Solih in the second round with 54.04% to 46%. This election vividly demonstrated the multiple logics of Maldivian electoral politics.

Turnout and Voter Sentiment: Turnout exceeding 85% showed that Maldivian citizens are highly engaged in politics, but this engagement does not equate to loyalty to any party. During the campaign, voters focused on substantive issues including the housing crisis in the capital Malé, falling dollar reserves, and economic debt pressures.

Geopolitical Influence: The 2023 election was widely seen as a proxy referendum on the competing influence of India and China in the Indian Ocean. Muizzu advocated strengthening economic ties with China, while Solih leaned toward maintaining traditional relations with India. One voter outside a polling station said, "The truth is, either of them will try to control the Maldives – it's inevitable." Geopolitics weighed heavily on voters' decisions, but this influence was more about abstract appeals to "national sovereignty" and "economic independence" than loyalty to any particular party.

Fragmentation and Unity: The pre-election split in the MDP saw The Democrats take about 7% of the vote in the first round, and the abstention of those voters in the second round directly led to Solih's defeat. This reveals an important pattern: in Maldivian elections, internal party fragmentation often has a more decisive impact than competition between parties.

IV. Outlook for the 2028 Election: PNC's Advantages and Risks

The PNC won landslide victories in the 2023 presidential election and the 2024 parliamentary election (66 out of 93 seats, a two-thirds majority). However, the results of the 2026 local elections and referendum indicate that the PNC's political advantage is eroding rapidly. Winning only 11% of city council seats in the five cities, and facing 71% opposition in the referendum – these figures should be seen as important bellwethers for the 2028 presidential election.

PNC's Advantages:

First, President Muizzu still held 62% overall approval in a December 2025 poll, indicating that his personal political capital remains strong. The poll showed that 67% of voters aged 55 and above support Muizzu, with female support (64%) slightly higher than male (60%), but support among young voters (18-24) was only 50%. Second, the PNC holds an overwhelming parliamentary majority, and Muizzu is pushing for electoral reforms – including abolishing the second round of presidential elections and merging presidential and parliamentary elections. If these reforms pass, they could favour the PNC. Third, the reunited MDP still faces internal leadership competition. Former President Solih has already announced he will run in the MDP primary for 2028, and the primary could consume the opposition's political resources.

PNC's Weaknesses and Risks:

First, economic distress is the PNC's biggest vulnerability. The Maldives' debt-to-GDP ratio surged from 97.7% in 2023 to 114.6% in 2024, and official reserve assets fell to approximately $371 million, an eight-year low. Tourism – the Maldives' largest source of foreign exchange – saw a 23% decline in the first half of March 2026 due to flight cancellations caused by Gulf conflict. Former President Yameen criticised the Muizzu government as "the most incompetent and authoritarian government in Maldivian history," accusing it of rising prices, increased living costs, and continued economic deterioration.

Second, allegations of democratic backsliding are eroding the PNC's political legitimacy. The Muizzu government passed an anti-defection law, suspended three of seven Supreme Court justices, and forced two others to resign, drawing criticism for "suppressing democracy." The opposition MDP has accused the government of "systematically centralising power and weaponising state institutions against opposition members." This erosion of democratic institutions may further galvanise voters to express their discontent at the ballot box in 2028.

Third, the 71% rejection in the 2026 referendum sent a clear signal. As former President Solih warned: "Acting only for immediate self-interest could lead to defeat... merging elections could bring Muizzu a major setback in 2028." Citizens clearly rejected the government's attempt to concentrate power. More notably, some analysis suggests that even a significant portion of PNC supporters voted against the government's constitutional amendment – a dangerous signal that the ruling party's core voter base is also shaking.

V. Key Variables for the 2028 Election

Based on the above analysis, victory in the 2028 election will depend on the following variables:

Citizen perceptions matter more than party mobilisation: If the PNC can genuinely address economic problems – controlling debt, stabilising the Rufiyaa, restoring tourism growth – Muizzu's personal approval could remain high. Conversely, if economic distress persists, voters will again use their ballots to express discontent. Party activists and local leaders need to understand that the diminishing returns of their intensive vote-buying and mobilisation efforts are already visible – because what truly determines electoral outcomes is ordinary citizens' overall perception of their living conditions, not short-term material exchanges.

Citizen acceptance of reform agendas: If the PNC's proposed electoral reforms – abolishing the second round, merging elections – are perceived by citizens as "power centralisation" rather than "efficiency improvement," they will further erode the PNC's political capital. The 2026 referendum result has already shown that citizens have a stronger-than-expected protective instinct toward constitutional order and checks and balances. Party activists who continue to ignore this deep concern will face even greater political backlash.

The unity and strength of the opposition: Since reuniting in 2025, the MDP has been actively courting centrist voters at the grassroots level. If the MDP can maintain internal cohesion and field a broadly appealing candidate by 2028, the PNC will face a serious challenge. However, the MDP has a long history of factional infighting, which could be a weakness the PNC can exploit. But party strategists need to realise that voter disgust with internal party warfare is growing – parties that cannot demonstrate effective governance, no matter how unified they appear, will struggle to win citizens' trust.

The preferences of young voters: Support for Muizzu among 18-24 year olds is only 50%, the lowest of any age group. This generation has grown up under Maldivian multiparty democracy and has different political expectations from older generations. If the PNC cannot win the support of young voters, its electoral prospects in 2028 will face a structural challenge.

Conclusion

The electoral history of the Maldives since 2008 reveals a simple yet profound truth: elections are not won by the strength of political parties. Party mobilisation, campaign funds, and organisational networks are all important, but they are not the fundamental determinants of victory. What truly emerges from the votes is the collective judgement of ordinary citizens – their feelings about the economy, their defence of democratic institutions, their concern for national sovereignty, and their expectations for their own lives.

The April 2026 local elections and referendum have already sent a clear signal to the PNC. Citizens defended the constitutional order with 71% opposition, and expressed discontent with the ruling party through the complete loss of mayoral seats. However, the door to the 2028 election is not closed to the PNC. With just over two years until the November 2028 election, if the PNC can heed the message sent by citizens – genuinely addressing economic hardships, respecting democratic institutions, and responding to citizen concerns – it still retains a significant advantage to win re-election. But if party activists and local leaders continue to forget the simple fact that "elections are won or lost based on the views of citizens," the results of 2026 will be merely the prelude to an even larger political realignment.

The PNC still has an advantage. But whether that advantage translates into victory in 2028 will depend not on how the party machine operates, but on whether, at the moment they cast their ballots, ordinary citizens believe this party deserves their votes.